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Determinants of Corporate Investment: Post Liberalization Panel Data 
Evidence from Indian Firms  
  
 
  
Abstract 
 
The paper models alternative investment-accelerator relationships within the neoclassical theory 
of Jorgenson followed by firm level panel data estimation and empirical test for other 
determinants of corporate investment e.g., internal liquidity, profitability, and firms’ financial 
strength. Athey and Laumas (1994) claimed that internal liquidity had replaced market demand 
in Indian firm level investment. Others indicate presence of finance constraints in Indian private 
sector investment activities; Kumar et al. (2001, 2002). Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of 
liberalization whether market demand had still not been important when availability of internal 
liquidity, firms’ profitability and creditworthiness are considered. We consider Indian 
manufacturing firms in the post-reform period of 1990s. There is significant support for the 
investment–accelerator relationship. Internal liquidity is relatively more important than 
profitability when it comes to firms’ investment decisions. There is also evidence that credit 
worthiness of firms to outside creditors is important for firm investment decision. 
 
 
Keywords: Business fixed investment, sales accelerator, retained earnings, profitability, 
financial strength. 
 
JEL classification: C23; D21; E13; E22; G31; G32.  
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I. Introduction 
Over the last decade and half there has been a widespread change of opinion in India about the 
role of the state vis-à-vis private enterprises in promoting economic growth. Underlying this 
opinion is the belief that resources will be used more productively if they are transferred to the 
private sector. Since the expansion of public investment is usually constrained as part of fiscal 
austerity measures embodied in structural adjustment program, the required recovery of 
investment has to come largely from the private sector. The behavior of private investment has 
therefore, become a major focus of attention in developing countries like India in assessing the 
reform outcome.  
 
Two macroeconomic issues have become important in the context of investment activities of a 
developing country like India: the role (or lack) of FDI in corporate investment activity, and the 
effects of public and private savings on aggregate investment.1 In India, since 1991 the central 
government introduced a number of changes in the country’s regulatory policies under the SAP. 
As a result, the government-approved FDIs increased substantially.2 While the investment 
approvals show a promising picture, a point of considerable anxiety is the slow pace of actual 
inflows. FDI inflows do not start flowing immediately after the approval. There exists a time lag 
between approvals and inflows, especially for large and long gestation projects. Official figures 
indicate that inflows constitute about one-fifth of the approvals (Economic Survey, 1999). 
Therefore, in the first decade of liberalization FDI was not a major source of external finance to 
corporate investment in India. One survey by Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
(ISID) in 1994 revealed that the major consideration for the Indian companies to enter into a 
collaboration agreement is to get superior technology. Access to foreign funds has a very low 
priority. A major focus of the Indian liberalization policies had been to dismantle the complex 
web of controls that severely constrained the emergence and operation of the private 
entrepreneurs.3 This process has had maximum impact on the industrial sector, as it has changed 
its business environment and future growth dynamics. The growth in industrial output is 
                                                          
1 FDI flows to developing countries are primarily supported with the view that (i) it supplements domestic savings 
and thereby promote economic growth and employment, and (ii) encourage transfer of technology to help the host 
countries to break out of the vicious circles of underdevelopment — low levels of savings and investment. 
2 For example, during the first year of liberalization, i.e., 1991-92, approved investment shot up to Rs. 534 cr. from 
Rs. 128 cr. in 1990, i.e., a growth rate of 317%. By March 1998, official estimates indicate that the approved FDI 
was of the amount of Rs. 1, 58, 770 crores. See, Ministry of Industry, India, SIA Newsletter, April 1998. 
3 The licensing regime established under Industries Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) in 1951 coupled with 
import restrictions controlled the private sector decisions at every stage, from entry into an industry to capacity 
expansion, to choice of technology, even output mix and import content. For details, see Ahluwalia (1985). 
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primarily associated with new investment in plant and machinery. If firms are confident that 
demand will remain buoyant, they invest more in new plant and machinery which generates even 
more demand.  
 
There are a few studies using pre-reform as well as post-liberalization data on private investment 
in India. See for example, Athey and Laumas (1994), Eastwood and Kohli (1999), Athey and 
Reeser (2000), Kumar et al. (2001), and Athukorala and Sen (2002), among others. The present 
study is another attempt to learn more about the empirical determinants of private corporate 
investment activity in India particularly during the post-liberalization period. The aim is to 
examine the role of accelerators and financial variables affecting business fixed investment and 
try to disentangle their individual importance. In other words, we attempt to point out that both 
the demand factors and firms’ internal funds are important to Indian manufacturing firms’ 
investment activities in the post-liberalization period.  
 
Section II builds our theoretical models. It also discusses the theoretical issues related to capital 
market imperfections and the relationship between finance constraints and investment. Section 
III gives a brief review of existing empirical literature. Section IV explains the data set, variables 
and the empirical models used in this study. Section V describes the estimation method. The 
regression results with accelerator(s) and liquidity are discussed in Section VI followed by the 
empirical evidence on profitability and financial strength in Section VII. Finally, concluding 
remarks are given in Section VIII.   
 
II. Theoretical Model 
Jorgenson (1963) presented the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation. Consider a 
representative firm employing only two factors of production, namely labor (L) and capital (K) to 
maximize the present value of the stream of its net profit (π ) over an infinite horizon. The 
dynamic optimization problem can be stated as maximization of π  given a well-behaved 
neoclassical production function:   
1.1 
0
Maximize  [ { (θ ) }]rt I I IPY wL P I PY wL P zrP K dteπ τ δ
∞ −=  − − −  − − +∫                                                     
where         ( )Y Y L,K=  with L KY ,Y  > 0  and LL KKY ,Y  <  0; and I K K
. δ= +   
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P is the exogenously given output price, Y is the output level, w is the given wage rate IP  is the 
purchase price of capital goods, I is gross investment. τ (0 < τ < 1) is the profit tax rate and ‘θ’ 
proportion of the firm’s depreciation cost and ‘z’ proportion of its interest cost are “chargeable 
against income for tax purposes”; the depreciation rate is δ  and the interest cost of loan is r.                              
 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function (Y AL Kα β= where A, α and β are the 
technological coefficients), we will obtain the capital demand function which using time 
subscripts can be written as   
 
1.2 l
t t
t I
t t
PYK
c P
β=  where  l [(1 θ) (1 ) ]
(1 )t
z rc τ δ ττ
− + −= −   is the real user cost of capital.  
The desired capital stock of the firm can be obtained from 1.2: 
1.3 *t t tK Yµ=   where ltt I
t t
P
P c
βµ  =    
  is time dependent capital-output ratio. 
 
Chenery (1952) and Koyck (1954) developed the Flexible accelerator model of investment 
behavior. In this model, at any given time period, a firm can only close a fraction of the gap 
between the desired and its inherited capital stock. Therefore, net investment function ( NI ) 
follows the following adjustment rule: 
1.4 *1 1 [ ],  0 1t t t tK K K Kλ λ− −− = − < <  
 
λ  is known as the ‘speed of adjustment’ of capital which depends upon various factors like 
construction time, adjustment costs, delivery lags and so on. It is however, assumed to remain 
constant over time.  
 
Jorgenson and his associates distinguished between the (traditional) accelerator models and their 
neoclassical conceptualizations. See for instance, Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967), Jorgenson 
and Siebert (1968), and Jorgenson (1971). We argue that accelerator principles can also be 
obtained from within the neoclassical framework; thereby, alternative neoclassical investment-
accelerator relationships can be formulated. Four different accelerator models will be obtained 
from 1.2. Specific rules will be suggested to describe the relationship between rate of net 
investment and rate of change in the desired capital stock of the firm.  
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The proposed models are identified as nominal or real accelerator models depending upon 
whether nominal or real output determines investment. These models are  
(a) rate of real net investment as a function of rate of change in nominal output of the firm and 
rate of change in nominal user cost of capital: Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model I;  
(b) rate of nominal net investment as a function of rate of change in nominal output of the firm 
and rate of change in real user cost: Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model II; 
(c) rate of real net investment as a function of rate of change in output and rate of change in 
real user cost where real capital is expressed in terms of the unit of output: Neoclassical Real 
Accelerator Model I; and 
(d) rate of real net investment as a function of rate of change in output, rate of change in real 
user cost, and the difference between inflation in the output price and inflation in investment 
good price: Neoclassical Real Accelerator Model II. 
 
Therefore, we derive three real net investment functions and one nominal net investment 
function within a neoclassical framework.4  
 
Rule I:    
*
* ,  0  1
N t t
t
t t
dK dKi
K dt K dt
λ λ= =  〈 〈   
N
ti  is the rate of (real) net investment. The proportionality factor λ  is similar to the ‘speed of 
adjustment’ of real capital stock λ in the flexible accelerator model. 
 
Let us now derive the neoclassical models in algebraic terms. Rewriting 1.3 gives us 
1.5 * tt
t
VK
c
β=     
where t t tV PY=  is the nominal output of the firm and  tc  is the nominal user cost of capital that 
varies over time with investment good’s price, tax rate, etc. Taking natural logarithm of 1.5 and 
then differentiating with respect to time, Rule I allows us to obtain 
                                                          
4 The neoclassical nominal accelerator models are based on the presumption that changes in the nominal value of 
output reflect a firm’s expectations about similar changes in its sales proceeds. These changes then bring about 
corresponding adjustments in the desired capital stock of the firm. In the Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model I, 
the effect on real net investment is considered. On the other hand, Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model II 
considers the effect of nominal output changes on the nominal value of net investment. In this latter model it is being 
hypothesized that firms wish to attain nominal values of desired capital stock, hence undertake nominal net 
investments.  
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1.6 ( )Nt t ti v cλ= −   
where 1 tt
t
dVv
V dt
=  is the nominal output accelerator variable and 1 tt
t
dcc
c dt
= . 1.6 describes the 
Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model I where the current rate of change in nominal output 
(along with the current rate of change in the nominal user cost of capital) determine the present 
rate of real net investment.  
 
Rule II:     
*
*
~~ ~ ~
~
~
~ ,  0 1
tN t
t
t t
d Kd Ki
K dt K dt
λ λ= =  〈  〈   
where 
~
I
t t tK P K=  is the actual nominal capital stock of a firm. 
~λ  is the acceleration coefficient. 
 
We rewrite 1.3 as  
1.7 l
*
~
t t
t
K V
c
β=   
Using a similar method, we obtain the Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model II:  
1.8 
~N
t t ti v cλ= −   

  where tv  as defined above and l
l
l
.
t
t
t
cc
c
=  
In this model, the current rate of change in the real user cost of capital along with the current 
rate of change in nominal output determine the present rate of nominal net investment.  
 
We now consider two versions of the Neoclassical Real Accelerator Model. Model I expresses 
capital in terms of the unit of output. This has been quite common in the existing empirical 
literature where both the value of capital stock and the sales revenues have been deflated by a 
general price index. See, for instance Bilsborrow (1977), and Fazzari and Athey (1987). 
However, Neoclassical Real Accelerator Model II follows a conventional theoretical practice 
where both capital and output are measured in their respective units.   
 
Rule III:       l
m
m
 mm 
*
*
,   0 1N t tt
t t
d K d Ki
K dt K dt
λ λ= =  〈  〈  
where m
I
t t
t
t
P KK
P
=  is actual real capital and m*tK  is desired real capital, both expressed in terms of 
the unit of output. λ  is the adjustment speed of real net investment. 
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As before, we first rewrite 1.3 as 
1.9 m l
* .tt
t
YK
c
β =  
 
Then, using Rule III we obtain the following: 
 
1.10 l  lNt t ti y cλ    = −   
where ty  is the rate of change in output and ltc  as defined above. 1.10 describes the Neoclassical 
Real Accelerator Model I where the present rate of real net investment is determined by the 
current rate of change in output and real user cost. 
 
 
For Neoclassical Real Accelerator Model II, rewrite 1.3 again as 
1.11 l
* t
t tI
tt
PK Y
Pc
β  =   
  
 
Using Rule I, we have the following: 
 
1.12 ( ) lN It t t t ti y cλ π π = + − −    
where   and It tπ π  are the respective inflation rates of output and investment good. Therefore, in 
this real accelerator model, the difference between the inflation rates will also matter unless they 
are equal to each other, beside the present rate of change in output and real user cost.5  
 
For further details on alternative investment-accelerator functional relationships, see 
Bhattacharyya and Sinha (2004).    
 
However, there are some valid criticisms of the accelerator models of investment. Among others, 
an important one is that financial constraints of firms do not play any role. The same is true even 
for the neoclassical theory of capital accumulation. These theories rely heavily upon the 
assumption that the firm has no financial constraint. Absence of such a constraint can exist in a 
perfectly competitive capital market. Modigliani and Miller (1958) pointed out that in such a 
situation the capital structure of a corporate firm is irrelevant to its investment decisions. In a 
                                                          
5 Often in theoretical discussions, authors assume equal inflation rate for output and investment goods. It is also 
quite common to assume static price expectations. See, for instance Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Scarth (1982) among 
others.  
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world of perfect capital market, investment differs across firms only due to the differences in 
their expected future profitability of the prospective investment projects.  
 
But in reality, there may exist different sorts of imperfections in the capital market. The capital 
market may be segmented, catering to the needs of a selected few. There may be credit rationing. 
Consequently, firms will not only undertake a smaller amount of investment, at the same time 
they may lower their desired capital stock. The capital structure (debt-equity ratio) and the 
ownership structure (ratio of inside to outside equity holding) will have their respective 
discriminatory roles in the determination of the realized amount of investment. Therefore, firms’ 
investment and financing decisions become interdependent.  
 
II.1 Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs and Transaction Costs 
In the theoretical literature, three alternative factors (not always independent of each other) are 
commonly cited which create a wedge between the cost of external and internal finance. These 
are asymmetric information, managerial agency problems and transaction costs.  
 
Theoretical discussions on asymmetric information attempted to demonstrate how information 
costs in the presence of internal resource constraints of a firm affect its fixed investment 
activities. See for instance, Fazzari and Peterson (1993), and Hubbard (1998). Empirical studies 
have attempted to isolate the effects of information and internal resources on investment, 
independent of changes in investment opportunities, see Whited (1992) and Audretsch and 
Elston (2002).  
 
Higher interest costs can cause relatively good firms with safer projects to leave the applicant 
pool (adverse selection). It can also induce firms to undertake riskier projects with expected 
higher returns (moral hazard). The net effect of the two can further aggravate the already 
existing cost disadvantage and the liquidity problem for the investing firms. 
 
An internally liquidity constrained firm either facing credit constraint or higher interest cost finds 
it difficult to obtain funds from other sources, in particular the debt and equity market. Because 
there may arise agency costs of equity and debt financing; Jensen and Meckling (1976).   
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Apart from asymmetric information and managerial agency problems, another important factor 
contributing to financial stringency is transaction costs. “The TCE (transaction cost economics) 
approach to corporate finance examines individual investment projects and distinguishes among 
them in terms of their asset specificity characteristics”, Williamson (1988, p. 579, parenthesis 
mine). Let us assume that initially the only form of external finance available to the firm is debt. 
Debt financing requires the debtors to make regular interest payments, meet certain liquidity 
tests, set up sinking funds, and repay the principal at the expiry date. Failure to make scheduled 
payments will result in liquidation of firm’s physical assets. Debtors will try to raise funds 
through sale of its assets. It will depend upon the degree of redeployability of firm’s assets. “The 
upshot is that whereas highly redeployable assets will be financed with debt, equity is favored as 
assets become highly non-redeployable”, Williamson (ibid, p. 581).  
 
Theoretical research has led to the empirical hypothesis that financial variables such as the 
availability of internal funds, access to external finance, and functioning of credit markets affect 
capital formation of firms. The empirical literature claims that internal finance is the most 
important source of funds for capital spending at the firm level.  
 
III. Review of Empirical Literature on Indian Data 
The first comprehensive study on the investment behavior of Indian firms was by Krishnamurty 
and Sastry (1975) using data provided by the RBI and the Stock Exchange Official Directory. 
Their study suggested that the accelerator theory was important for Indian industries. Later, 
Athey and Laumas (1994) using panel data over the period 1978-86, examined the relative 
importance of sales accelerator and alternative internal sources of liquidity in investment 
activities of 256 Indian manufacturing firms. They found that when all the selected firms in the 
sample were considered together, current values of changes in real net sales, net profit, and 
depreciation were all significant in determining capital spending of firms. The authors suggested 
that, because of Indian government’s policy to promote small enterprises internal funds were 
relatively more important for large firms. Eastwood and Kohli (1999) considered Indian public 
limited companies of the small-scale industry during the period 1965-78. They concluded that 
small firms faced a relatively rigid financial environment where not only the supply of external 
credit was fixed irrespective of firms’ investment demands, but there were effective constraints 
regarding the usage of the funds as well. The study demonstrates that small and large firms in 
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India faced different financial environment during 1965-78. Athey and Reeser (2000) using a 
panel of 142 firms from 7 industrial groups in India over the period 1981-96 found that cash flow 
is more important for firms with limited access to capital markets. Is there still a binding finance 
constraint on firm investment activities in India?  In another recent study Kumar et al. (2001) 
attempted to investigate the presence of finance constraints among investing firms in the post-
liberalization period 1993-98, using Indian manufacturing firms as a case study. The authors 
suggested that exporting firms faced less restrictive finance constraints than their domestic 
counterparts. The sales accelerator was significant for domestic and small firms. It was not found 
significant for the exporting firms. Another important study in the Indian context is of 
Athukorala and Sen (2002) who examined the determinants of private corporate investment 
using data for the period 1954-96. These authors found lagged change in real bank credit to be an 
important source of external finance to Indian firms. Public investment has a strong 
complimentary relationship with private corporate investment in India.  
 
IV. Data and Variables 
This study uses annual data from the Profit and Loss Statements and the Balance Sheets of 
Indian corporate manufacturing firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange Official Directory. 
Firms are classified according to two broad industrial categories: Electronics, Electrical 
Equipment and Cables (EEEC) and General Engineering (GE). These two manufacturing 
industries are selected based on two observations: first, the maximum number of firms that we 
could obtain in any industry category; and secondly, in the post-liberalization period the longest 
time period that we could capture in our empirical study. One of the major drawbacks of the data 
in this Directory is the inconsistency in the reporting year of some firms. Therefore, for a 
balanced panel we could include a smaller number of firms. For instance, in EEEC although 
there are a total of 39 firms listed in the March-April, 2000, Vol. 15, of the Bombay Stock 
Exchange Official Directory, we could filter out only 26 firms for our empirical study.  
 
The balanced panel for EEEC covers a 7-year period from 1991-92 to 1997-98 with observations 
on 26 firms, a total of 182 (26×7) observations. Construction of the lagged variables extend the 
data period backwards into 1989-90. On the other hand, in GE although 33 firms are listed in the 
September-October, 2000, Vol. 13 of the Directory, we could filter out only 28 firms covering a 
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6-year period from 1993-94 to 1998-99 for our empirical study, leaving us with 168 (28×6) 
observations. The lagged variables extend the data period backwards up to 1990-91. 
 
The firms in EEEC produce various industrial electronic equipments, electronic communication 
equipments, generators, transformers, electric motors, furnaces, etc. The selected 26 firms in 
EEEC have heterogeneous product categories. GE data contains relatively more multi-product 
firms. In some cases firms have very distantly related products. The 28 selected firms produce a 
wide range of machines and machine tools, and consumer durables. In these two industries, the 
movements in firms' (nominal as well as real) net sales depict that all average values are much 
higher in GE, although the average annual percentage change over the years is bigger in EEEC.6 
Therefore, firms may be relatively bigger in size in GE, the over all growth of EEEC firms is 
more impressive. 
 
We define nominal Net Investment as the change in the Net Fixed Assets (NFA) over two 
successive periods. The real values of all variables are obtained by dividing the nominal values 
in a year by the year-end WPI. Similar to Audretsch and Elston (2002), and Bond et al. (2003) 
real sales values have been used in this study as a proxy for output.7  
 
Accumulated depreciation allowances and retained earnings are the two main internal sources of 
finance to a firm. Depreciation allowances are set aside primarily to replace the worn-out capital; 
where as retained earnings can be entirely used for new capital formation. See Chandra (2001). 
Our measures of internal liquidity are based on retained earnings which we find more relevant 
for net investment decisions of firms. Two variants of retained earnings are used in the 
regressions, namely the volume of retained earnings (RE) and retained earnings ratio (RER). 
Retained earnings is obtained from net profit. RER is measured as the ratio of retained earnings 
over net profit. One can obtain the dividend-payout ratio by deducting RER from unity. The 
purpose behind including RER is to examine whether retention practice vis-à-vis dividend-
payout decision is important to our selected sample of firms, in addition to the issue whether the 
volume of retained earnings that is available for investment is more important than firm retention 
                                                          
6 See, Appendix I. We report summary statistics of the selected variables. Summary statistics of other variables are 
available on request from the author.  
7 A more accurate measure of output could have been obtained by adding final goods inventories to the sales figures. 
However, inventory values of final goods for all selected firms for all the years are not available in the Directory.  
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practice.8 If the decision to pay dividends overrides savings motives of firms, volume of retained 
earnings will be determined residually. In other words, retention practices of firms will take a 
backseat. Therefore, the variable RER is expected to shed some light on this issue.  
 
We do not follow the existing practice in empirical studies where investment and liquidity 
variables are often deflated by the beginning of the period capital stock.9 We believe that in the 
presence of market imperfection, the volume of RE is all the more important. In other words, 
what is relatively more relevant to firms’ decision-making processes is the quantum of liquidity 
(RE) that is available internally in relation to the quantum of new additions per unit of capital 
stock, beside the decision to pay dividend vis-à-vis retaining profits for liquidity purpose 
(RER).10 
 
IV.1 Empirical Models 
Our choice of empirical models is largely guided by the availability of data. For instance, 
unavailability of data does not allow us to measure user cost of capital. Hence, in our regressions 
we ignore any independent role of user cost. Binswanger (1999, p.212) pointed out that, “… the 
cost of capital (and interest rates) has usually not performed well in empirical tests, and other 
variables, such as output, sales or profits, proved to be more relevant”. Fazzari and Peterson 
(1993) also found that the cost of capital effect is small compared to the strong effect of the 
accelerator. In the presence of such restrictions our empirical equations will not conform to the 
exact form of the algebraic relationships that have been obtained in Section II. However, all 
empirical models will have two common features: one period lagged dependent variable to bring 
in the short-run dynamism that is expected to exist in real world investment activities; and 
current and one period lagged accelerators in order to examine the influence of the present and 
immediate past, on current investment activities of firms. 
 
                                                          
8 Fazzari et al. (1988) among others classified firms according to their retention practices. We are unable to classify 
firms in a similar fashion due to the smallness of our sample, but directly test for the significance of retention 
practice in firm investment.  
9 One possible reason behind this practice in the literature could be to tackle the common problem of 
heteroskedasticity. Since we use the White (1980) corrected consistent covariance matrix estimator to obtain the 
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors, we felt there is no further need to deflate the variables again by a scale 
variable like capital stock to tackle the problem of heteroskedasticity. 
10 This is another reason why we do not deflate the liquidity variables by last period capital stock. There exist quite a 
few empirical studies which had done so. See for example, Tybout (1983), Fazzari and Athey (1987), Nabi (1989) 
and Eastwood and Kohli (1999). 
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Table I lists the four empirical models. The nominal investment functions are similar to the 
Neoclassical Nominal Accelerator Model II. And the real investment functions are similar to the 
Neoclassical Real Accelerator Model I. The other two models are not estimated because of the 
measurement problem with respect to real capital. The Stock Exchange Directory provides us 
with information on iK  which allows us to obtain lK  using WPI. It does not contain information 
on K.  
 
The general form of the two-way panel data regression equation to be used will be  
1.13 1 2 , 1 3 , 1i tit it iti t i tz zx xυα γ γ γ ε− −+= + + + +   
where itz  is a measure of investment and itx  is a measure of accelerator. iα  contains the firm 
specific effects and tυ  the time specific effects. itε  is the white noise error term. Firm specific 
effects can be due to unobserved entrepreneurial or managerial skills of the firm’s management. 
They can also represent other things like the user cost differentials; see Bond et al. (2003). The 
time specific effects on the other hand, can account for strike year effects that disrupt investment, 
delivery lags in receiving capital goods, etc. see Samuel (1996). 
 
Table I:  Empirical Models 
 
Nominal Net Investment Function I:        
 
             
Nominal Net Investment Function II:                                  
                        
 
Real Net Investment Function I:              
                   
                              
Real Net Investment Function II:           
                           
 All variables follow their definitions as discussed in Section II. 
 
V. Estimation Method 
In our empirical study we use panel data consisting of pooled time series of cross sections in 
which one has repeated observations on the cross-section units (firms) over time. Initially, using 
the SAS software, we try both types of alternative panel data models namely, Random Effects 
and Fixed Effects models. The Hausman (1978) specification test for REM and the F- test for 
FEM reject both these types of model specifications, and hence we plan to use the OLS method 
to estimate the empirical models. With limited time series observations it is difficult to find out 
i k
, , 11 2 , 1 3
N N
i t i t i tit iti ti is sυα γ γ γ ε−−+= + + + +
j k
, , 11 2 , 1 3
N N
i t i t i tit iti tI IS Sυα γ γ γ ε−−+ ∆ ∆= + + + +
 
, , 1, 11 2 3
N N
i t i ti t it i t iti is sυα γ γ γ ε−−+= + + + + 
l l
, , 1, 11 2 3
N N
i t i ti t it i t itI IS Sυα γ γ γ ε−−+ ∆ ∆= + + + + 
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whether errors are autocorrelated. In other words, each regression equation can be tested firm-
wise for autocorrelation, but we do not have sufficient time series data to conduct Durbin’s h 
test. 
 
V.1 Specification Tests 
Conventional regression specification assumes two properties: Orthogonality and Sphericality.  
(a) Orthogonality: 0E u X = , where E denotes expectation, u is the vector of random error 
terms and X is the vector of explanatory variables. 
(b) Sphericality: 2V u X Iσ= , where V denotes variance, 2σ  is the population variance 
and  I  is an identity matrix. 
 
The ‘orthogonality’ property implies that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the 
random error terms, and hence exogenous to the model. It is the violation of ‘orthogonality’ 
property that leads to biased and inconsistent estimates, whereas if ‘sphericality’ is not satisfied 
then the estimator will not be efficient. In Section V.1.1 we mention failure of the orthogonality 
property of the regressors; and in Section V.1.2 we focus on the sphericality property of the error 
distribution. 
 
V.1.1 Hausman LM Test 
In a seminal paper, Hausman (1978) suggested a test of exogeneity of the regressors. We conduct 
exogeneity test on all the explanatory variables used in our regression models. The Hausman LM 
test statistic when compared with the χ2 value with 1 df, indicates whether an explanatory 
variable is exogenous or not. Under H0, LM asymptotically approaches 2χ  distribution with 1 
degree of freedom (df). If H0 is rejected, then the concerned explanatory variable is endogenous 
at a particular significance level. The Hausman LM Test results are given in Appendix II.  
 
V.1.2 White Correction 
One of the classical assumptions of the standard linear regression model is that the variance of 
the disturbance term is constant (or homogenous) across observations. If this assumption is 
violated then the error term is said to be heteroskedastic. If the extent of heteroskedasticity is 
mild, OLS standard errors behave quite well; see Long and Ervin (2000). However, when 
heteroskedasticity is severe, ignoring it may bias our standard errors and concerned p values. 
White (1980) resolved this problem by obtaining a covariance matrix estimator that is consistent 
even in the presence of heteroskedasticity that does not depend on any specific heteroskedastic 
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structure of the error term. Consider the following model      Y X β ε= + where X is a n K×  
matrix, Y is a 1n×  vector, and ε  is the 1n×  vector of random errors. Assuming that X  and ε  
are uncorrelated, let us define the OLS estimator as l 1( )X X X Yβ −′ ′= . Now consider the vector of 
the estimated residuals  lY Xε β= − , which holds the key to obtaining the following 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimator   
            ( )21 1( ) ( )X X X diag X X X Yε− − ′ ′ ′    
White (ibid.) proved that using this estimator to test the linear hypotheses would give correct 
results asymptotically. The corrected standard errors are square root of the diagonal elements of 
the matrix shown above. 
 
VI. Empirical Results 
The regression results appear in Tables II – V. In case of endogenous explanatory variables, we 
use the predicted values of the variables from the regressions of these variables on their 
respective instruments, as regressors in the regressions.11 Assuming that there is some degree of 
heteroskedasticity present in our data, we obtain the White (1980) corrected t-ratios of all 
parameter estimates. We use 0.7 as the cut-off correlation coefficient among the explanatory 
variables to retain the right hand side variables in the regressions. Therefore, the reported results 
contain only those (significant) variables among which the correlation coefficient is less than or 
equal to 0.7, thereby indicating absence of any serious multicollinearity among them. Also, the 
following tables contain only those parameter estimates and their corresponding White corrected 
t-values, which are statistically significant at least at five percent (two-tailed test).  
 
The regression estimates from Nominal Net Investment Function I are shown in Table II.  The 
current accelerator is significant in EEEC, where as the lagged accelerator is significant in GE 
with expected signs. This indicates that in GE, sales affect net investment only with a lag.12 The 
strength of the current accelerator and the lagged accelerator alter only marginally with the 
inclusion of liquidity. In EEEC the lagged accelerator which was not significant in the 
                                                          
11 The Hausman LM Test reveals that none of the (nominal as well as real) liquidity variables are endogenous. 
12 We have not investigated into the effects of sales beyond two periods primarily to avoid any further reduction in 
the number of observations. Recall our discussion where it was pointed out that not only the number of reporting 
firms is quite small, the sample size had to be reduced further to establish a reasonable clarity among the firms from 
several points of view, for instance uniformity in the reporting months of the firms. 
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accelerator model, becomes significant in the presence of the liquidity variables. The coefficient 
of the current accelerator is greater than the coefficient of the lagged accelerator, implying that in 
EEEC the effect of the current accelerator induced investment is stronger than that of the lagged 
accelerator. In both the industries, only the one period lagged liquidity (RER or RE) is 
statistically significant. Both retained earnings ratio and volume of retained earnings are 
positively related to nominal investment rate. The lagged dependent variable is statistically 
significant in both the industries implying that investment is a dynamic phenomenon. However, 
it becomes insignificant in either industry with the inclusion of the liquidity variables.  
 
Table II 
 Nominal (Net) Investment Function I with Accelerator(s) and Internal Liquidity 
Table II.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
 
(White corrected t statistic in parenthesis) 
i j 2
1Accelerator Model: 0.22   0.12   0.31   ;   0.09;     =182
                                      (4.10)   (1.92)         (2.06)
N N
t t t
a b b
i i s R N−= + + =  
 
i 2
1 -1RER Model:  0.33   0.07  0.32 Liquidity  ;  0.10;     =182
                             (1.98)       (2.68)        (1.87)
N
t t t t
b a b
i s s R N−=   +   +   =  
 
i 2
1 -1RE Model:  0.33   0.08  1.87E 07 Liquidity  ;  0.09;     =182
                           (2.13)      (2.66)           (1.87)    
N
t t t t
b a b
i s s R N−=  +  + −  =  
 
     
Table II.2: General Engineering 
                           
i j 2
1 1Accelerator Model:  0.07   0.28   0.25   ;   0.09;     =168
                                        (3.03)   (2.58)       (1.83)
N N
t t t
a a b
i i s R N− −=  +  +  =  
 
j 2
1 1RER Model: 0.24  0.14 Liquidity  ;   0.07;    168
                            (1.86)       (1.84)      
N
t t t
b b
i s R N− −= + = =  
 
i 2
1 1RE Model:  0.27   4.07E 08 Liquidity  ;   0.07;     168
                          (2.10)              (2.54)
N
t t t
b a
i s R N− −= + − = =  
 
  a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. 
 
 
 
Table III contains parameter estimates from Nominal Net Investment Function II. The current 
sales accelerator is positively significant in EEEC. In GE the lagged accelerator remains 
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significant. Additionally, with the inclusion of liquidity there is evidence in favor of the lagged 
accelerator in EEEC and the current accelerator in GE. The effect of current sales induced 
investment remains relatively stronger in EEEC while the lagged accelerator is relatively 
dominant in GE, even with the inclusion of the liquidity variables. Unlike the previous model, 
only the 2-period lagged liquidity variables are statistically significant in this model in both the 
industries. While in EEEC both the alternative liquidity variables (RER and RE) are significant 
determinants of level of investment, only RE is significant for GE firms. What we have observed 
with respect to the RER model for GE is that none of the two lagged RER variables is 
statistically significant in isolation of the other. In the presence of the 1-period lagged RER, the 
2-period lagged RER is statistically significant at 5%. However, since the 1-period lagged 
liquidity is statistically insignificant, dropping it from the regression renders the 2-period lagged 
RER insignificant as well.13  The lagged dependent variable is significant only in the RER model 
for EEEC; in the RE models in both the industries the lagged dependent variable has been 
replaced by the accelerators and liquidity variables. 
 
 
Table III 
Nominal (Net) Investment Function II with Accelerator(s) and Internal Liquidity 
Table III.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
 
(White corrected t statistic in parenthesis)                                         
j j 2
-1 1Accelerator Model:  0.65   0.26    0.08   ;       0.30;   182
                                        (4.09)        (2.82)           (1.69)
N N
t t t t
a a b
I I S S R N−= + ∆ + ∆ = =
 
 
j j 2
-1 1 2RER Model:  326220  0.61  0.26   0.09   387775 Liquidity ;  0.31;  182
                                    (2.46)     (4.16)       (2.85)          (1.90)              (2.4
N N
t t t t t
a a b b
I I S S R N− −= − + + ∆ + ∆ + = =
2)a
 
j 2
1RE Model:  99740  0.24   2.27   ;  0.47;  182
                                (2.00)    (3.27)         (3.45)
N
t t t
a a a
I S S R N−= − + ∆ + ∆ = =
 
 
       
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. 
 
                                                          
13 When the 1-period lagged liquidity is not important, why the 2-period lagged liquidity is significant for current 
investment? Although we find it difficult to interpret this finding in terms of economic theory, one can only say that 
the ‘level’ of investment is determined by internal funds available two-period back. Indeed, it remains a question 
that why the availability of liquidity in the immediate past is not important in deciding the ‘level’ of investment 
expenditures. One interpretation may be that firms maintain the cash flow of immediate past to support (if needed) 
their current operating cost and use up accumulated internal funds available two-period back to help financing new 
investment. And, since the available cash flow is net of dividend payments, interest payments and tax payments the 
firms want them to grow for distant future (use). Therefore, by not using the liquidity from immediate past the firms 
can give extra time to that liquidity to grow further and instead use the internal funds available previous to the 
immediate past to finance current investment expenditures.  
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 Table III.2: General Engineering 
 
 
j j 2
-1 1Accelerator Model:  0.79   0.10   ;  0.79;   168
                                         (2.00)       (2.53)
N N
t t t
a a
I I S R N−= + ∆ = =  
                                                                                                   
j 2
1 2RE Model:  0.07   0.16    1.27  Liquidity ;  0.63;   168
                           (1.83)         (2.96)            (3.99)
N
t t t t
b a a
I S S R N− −= ∆ + ∆ + = =          
                                                   
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. 
 
From the tables on nominal net investment functions, two main observations can be made on the 
role of accelerator and internally available liquidity in net investment activities of firms in the 
selected sample. First, in most cases, both the internal liquidity variables (RER as well as RE) 
along with the accelerator(s) are statistically significant determinants of net investment activities 
of Indian manufacturing firms. In one case (Nominal Net Investment Function II in GE) RE is 
the only significant liquidity variable. Second, in all the reported regressions, only one of the two 
lagged liquidity variables is important for current investment decisions.  
 
We now turn to the real net investment functions. The parameter estimates from Real Net 
Investment Function I are reported in Table IV. This model produces statistically meaningful 
results only for EEEC. The result for EEEC is very similar to its nominal net investment 
counterpart. The current (real) accelerator and the lagged dependent variable explains current 
rate of real net investment with similar coefficient values. The lagged accelerator surfaces only 
in the nominal RE model. However, the model is a poor fit for GE, hence not reported here. 
None of the explanatory variables are found statistically significant. There is also high 
correlation among the lagged liquidity variables in GE. The hint of a lagged effect of sales 
accelerator on investment in earlier models warrants the presence of a two-period lagged 
accelerator in the regression. Unfortunately, our data set limits testing this hypothesis.  Except 
for the real RE model, only the first lagged liquidity variables are significant in the liquidity 
models. As before, the lagged dependent variable has been replaced by internal liquidity.  
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Table IV 
Real (Net) Investment Function I with Accelerator(s) and Internal Liquidity 
Table IV.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
 
(White corrected t statistic in parenthesis) 
 
   
l m l 2
1Accelerator Model:  0.15   0.11    0.32 ;  0.09;   182
                                       (3.66)    (1.93)         (2.08)  
N N
t t t
a b b
i i s R N−= + + = =  
 
   
l l 2
-1RER Model:  0.33  0.33 Liquidity  ;  0.09;   182
                             (1.96)     (2.13)
N
t t t
b b
i s R N= + = =
 
 
 
   
l l m 2
1 -1
a a
RE Model:  0.14  0.34  0.07    1.90E 07 Liquidity ;  0.09;   182
                          (3.27)   (2.15)    (2.68)             (1.97)
N
t t t t
b a
i s s R N−= + + + − = =
 
 
 
                      
     a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. 
 
 
Finally, the statistical fit of Real Net Investment Function II can be seen from Table V.  The 
results are very similar to what we have seen earlier. The current accelerator is significant in 
EEEC, where as in GE the lagged accelerator affects current net investment. In GE, the effect of 
lagged accelerator becomes stronger in the presence of internal liquidity variable(s). The 
liquidity variables with a 2- period lag are found statistically significant in EEEC under the three 
different liquidity specifications: RER, nominal and real RE. However, in GE the 2- period 
lagged liquidity variables are significant in the RE models: nominal and real RE. The liquidity 
variable(s) under RER specification is not significant in GE. In this industry high correlation has 
been observed between 2-lagged RE and the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, the reported 
results in GE are obtained after dropping the lagged dependent variable. The lagged dependent 
variable is consistently found significant in EEEC.  
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Table V  
Real (Net) Investment Function II with Accelerator(s) and Internal Liquidity 
Table: V.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
 
(White corrected t statistic in parenthesis) 
m m l 2
-1
a
Accelerator Model:  0.68    0.23  ;   0.26;   182
                                        (4.43)         (2.58)   
N N
t t t
a
I I S R N= + ∆ = =  
m m l 2
-1 2RER Model:  1531.34  0.65    0.23   2527.37 Liquidity ; 0.26;  182
                                    (1.70)     (4.47)         (2.61)            (2.09)    
N N
t tt t
b a a b
I I S R N−= − + + ∆ + = =
                                                                   
m m l 2
-1 2RE Model:  738.29  0.23    0.22   0.01 Liquidity ;  0.42;   182
                                 (2.23)    (1.83)          (3.14)         (2.98)             
N N
t t t t
b a a a
I I S R N−= − + + ∆ + = =  
m m l 2
-1 2Real RE Model:  888.66  0.26    0.21   1.58 Liquidity ;  0.41;   182
                                         (2.27)    (2.09)         (3.11)          (2.95)       
N N
t t t t
b b a a
I I S R N−= − + + ∆ + = =
 
 
Table V.2: General Engineering 
 
m m m 2
-1 1Accelerator Model:  0.69    0.11   ;  0.66;   168
                                        (5.28)         (2.66)  
N N
t t t
a a
I I S R N−= + ∆ = =  
 
m m 2
1 2RE Model:  0.18   0.008 Liquidity  ;  0.52;   168
                           (3.89)             (4.06)   
N
t t t
a a
I S R N− −= ∆ + = =  
 
m m 2
1 -2Real RE Model:  0.17   1.00 Liquidity  ; 0.54;   168
                                   (3.74)            (4.18)
N
t t t
a a
I S R N−= ∆ + = =  
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. 
 
From the above seven tables, four for EEEC and three for GE, with different specifications of the 
dependent variable: nominal and real, rate and level, we conclude the following. 
(a) Only one of the two liquidity variables has been found significant in the models with 
liquidity. Out of a total of 14 regressions, the 1-period lagged liquidity has been statistically 
significant six times: four times in EEEC and twice in GE. In the remaining eight regressions, the 
2-period lagged liquidity has been found statistically significant five times in EEEC and thrice in 
GE. Therefore, availability of internal liquidity for investment in fixed capital is more important 
in EEEC than GE. 
(b) In most of the regressions, RE performs relatively better than RER. This can be interpreted 
by saying that the quantum of internally generated funds is relatively more important than firm 
 22
retention decisions. Nevertheless, presence of RER in 5 out of a total 14 regressions indicates 
some evidence in favor of firms being more concerned about retention ratio than their dividend 
payout ratio. 
(c) Under any model specification with liquidity, the current accelerator has remained 
consistently significant in EEEC with stable coefficient values. However, the lagged accelerator 
has not been so persistent in EEEC across the different models. On the other hand, the presence 
of the lagged accelerator is not only consistent in GE but has become stronger with the inclusion 
of liquidity.   
 
VII. Profitability and Financial Strength 
The preceding discussion revealed that retained earnings is one of the major determinants of 
corporate fixed investment, thereby indicating imperfections in the Indian capital market. In this 
section, we first explore the role of profitability in place of liquidity in firms’ new investment 
decisions. Second, we test the role of firms’ financial strength in new investment decisions.  
 
There can be two alternative justifications for including profitability in the regression. One is to 
test empirically the source of internal funds itself, that is, net profits. With this interpretation we 
go one step backward! Our objective will be to see whether undistributed ‘net profit per unit of 
net sales’ affects firm investment or not, as opposed to the conventional wisdom that firms 
decisions regarding dividend-payouts vis-à-vis retained earnings and the volume of retained 
earnings are significant for new investment projects. We hypothesize that increase in last 
period’s profitability induces current net investment. The other argument is that recent 
profitability of firms signal expected future profits that can affect firms’ investments. This 
emphasizes the forward-looking nature of investment decisions. We also explore firms’ 
accessibility to external capital and its relation to net investment activities.  The financial 
strength of firms determines their credit worthiness in the external capital market. Does previous 
period’s financial strength influence firms’ current investment decisions? We measure financial 
strength (FINS) as 
1
Net Worth ,
Total Assets t−
     commonly referred to as the ‘proprietary ratio’.
14  
                                                          
14 One can obtain the ‘ratio of total liabilities to total assets’ by deducting the proprietary ratio from unity. Therefore, 
the financial strength variable shows the importance of assets financed by equity in relation to borrowed funds, 
indicating the ‘margin of safety’ for creditors. The higher the proprietary ratio, the stronger is the financial position 
of the company and the more satisfactory is its financial structure from the point of view of creditors. In this sense, 
this ratio measures the credit worthiness of firms to outside creditors. 
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The descriptive statistics of the financial strength variable in the two industries reveal that the 
GE firms are marginally bigger than their EEEC counterparts. It appears that the GE firms are 
relatively more credit worthy than the EEEC firms. See Table 4, Appendix I. 
 
VII.1 Evidence on Profitability and Financial Strength 
The regression results with profitability and financial strength are discussed here. We maintain 
the same judgments to select models as discussed in Section VI. The Hausman LM test found 
profitability and financial strength variables exogenous in GE throughout. However, in EEEC 
profitability is found endogenous, although financial strength is exogenous across alternative 
models. See Table 2, Appendix II.  
 
The statistical fit of Nominal Net Investment Function I is shown in 1.14. Profitability is 
significant only in EEEC. In comparison to the liquidity models, the coefficient of the current 
accelerator marginally weakens, while the lagged accelerator remains stable.  
 
 1.14  
i
1 -1
EEEC
2
0.14  0.30  0.07  1.54 Profitability
             (2.55)   (1.83)    (2.12)       (2.42)
                        0.11;   182
N
t t t t
a b b a
i s s
R N
−= + + +
= =
  
  
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. White corrected t statistic in parenthesis.  
 
In both the industries, the financial strength variable does not perform satisfactorily when we 
estimate Nominal Net Investment Function I. 1.15 reports the performance of Nominal Net 
Investment Function II with profitability. The profitability model competes well with the RER 
model in EEEC. The current and lagged accelerator coefficients are same. Even in comparison to 
the RE model, the current accelerator remains quite stable. However, the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable is relatively smaller than the RER model. Profitability is again found 
statistically insignificant in GE, hence not reported here.  
 
1.15  
j j
1 1 1
EEEC
a a b a b
147652  0.26  0.09  0.54  1734005 Profitability
                  (2.32)      (2.79)        (1.89)          (3.78)           (2.17)
                                        
N N
t t t t tI S S I− − −= − + ∆ + ∆ + +
2
   0.32;  182R N= =
  
  
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. White corrected t statistic in parenthesis. 
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The regression estimates of Nominal Investment Function II with financial strength are reported 
in 1.16. Financial strength affects net investment positively in EEEC, whereas it is statistically 
insignificant in GE. Recall that the GE firms are relatively bigger and more credit-worthy than 
the EEEC firms. In other words, EEEC firms are relatively more credit constrained than their GE 
counterparts. The current and lagged accelerators maintain similar coefficients in the presence of 
financial strength. However, the coefficient value of the lagged dependent variable decreases in 
the presence of financial strength.  
 
1.16  
j j
1 1 1
EEEC
2
253514  0.26  0.10  0.58  575348 FINS
                  (2.26)      (2.82)        (2.02)          (4.10)          (2.11)
                                          0.31;  
N N
t t t t t
b a b a b
I S S I
R
− − −= − + ∆ + ∆ + +
=  182N =
 
  
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. White corrected t statistic in parenthesis. 
 
The Real Net investment Function I results with profitability are reported in 1.17. Inclusion of 
profitability still does not explain real net investment activities of GE firms. In EEEC, however, 
with the inclusion of profitability the effect of current accelerator becomes weaker compared to 
the liquidity models.   
 
1.17  
l l
1
EEEC
2
0.08  0.29   1.58 Profitability
             (1.89)   (1.77)      (2.76)  
                     0.10;   182
N
t t t
b b a
i s
R N
−= + +
= =
 
  a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. White corrected t statistic in parenthesis.  
 
In Real Net Investment Function I, financial strength (FINS) is statistically insignificant in both 
the industries. Recall that this model could not explain net investment activities of GE firms in 
earlier regressions. 
 
Regression results from Real Net Investment Function II with profitability are shown in 1.18. As 
before, profitability is statistically significant only in EEEC; the GE results are therefore not 
reported. Inclusion of profitability retains stable coefficient of the current accelerator. The lagged 
dependent variable is significant and its coefficient is nearer to the value observed in the RER 
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model. The intercept term which was statistically significant in the liquidity models is now 
insignificant with the inclusion of profitability.  
 
1.18  
m l m
1 1
EEEC
2
0.22  0.60  11348 Profitability
              (2.57)        (4.20)         (1.82)
                          0.27;   182
N N
t t t t
a a b
I S I
R N
− −= ∆ + +
= =
  
 
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. White corrected t statistic in parenthesis. 
 
The estimates from Real Net Investment Function II are shown in 1.19. Financial strength is 
positively significant only in EEEC. Similar to what we have witnessed in the nominal 
counterpart of this model, the accelerator remains stable with the inclusion of financial strength. 
However, the lagged dependent variable has become marginally weaker. 
 
1.19  
m l m
1 1
EEEC
2
 0.22   0.65  3874.98 FINS
               (2.58)          (4.45)          (1.83)
                           0.27;   182
N N
t t t t
a a b
I S I
R N
− −= ∆ + +
= =
 
 
a: significant at 1%; b: significant at 5%. White corrected t statistic in parenthesis. 
 
Therefore, profitability can be a viable alternative to internal liquidity in determining nominal as 
well as real net investment, in one of the two industries. However, internal liquidity is relatively 
more important than profitability when it comes to firms’ net investment decisions in both the 
industries. Only two investment models and that too only for one industry indicate statistical 
significance of financial strength of firms in their net investment decisions.   
 
VIII. Conclusion 
It is shown that acceleration principle is embedded within the neoclassical theory. Empirically, 
we attempted to explore that to what extent market demand had been important in India in the 
first decade of liberalization process when availability of internal liquidity, firms’ profitability 
and creditworthiness are considered. The four alternative investment models have been derived 
so that on one hand, we can look into the determinants of both nominal and real investment 
decisions of (selected) Indian manufacturing firms. While on the other hand, the paper wanted to 
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explore whether it is the level or rate of net investment that best explains the business fixed 
investment activity of the selected Indian manufacturing firms.  
 
Availability of internal liquidity is one of the important determinants of net investment activities 
of Indian manufacturing firms in the two selected industries. In fact, it complements the role of 
accelerator(s) in firm investment decisions. Volume of retained earnings is more important than 
the retention ratio; and retention practices of firms are relatively more important than their 
dividend payout decisions. Short-run profitability does not have consistent influence on 
investment decisions of firms. Financial strength vis-à-vis credit worthiness of firms to creditors 
is important for investment decisions in EEEC. GE firms being comparatively bigger are more 
credit worthy, and therefore, can access external capital with relatively more ease. 
 
This research does not claim to identify all the important determinants of corporate fixed 
investment in India. We have incorporated a few in this study, some more can be considered in a 
future project. For instance, the role of stock market on Indian firms’ investment activities. One 
way of taking into account the role of stock market is to incorporate Tobin’s q. However, there 
exist plenty of evidences that estimating q in a developing country context is too problematic. 
“Numerous practical difficulties arise in measuring Tobin’s q, especially in a developing country 
context”, Kumar et al. (2001, p. 138). Also see, Chatelain (2002) for a brief analysis of specific 
problems related to the q model.  
 
Our choice of empirical models has been largely guided by the availability of data. Despite its 
popularity with extant researchers like Athey and Laumas, the data from recent issues of the BSE 
Directory have not allowed us to measure user cost of capital and output of firms among other 
things like classification of firms into small, medium and large size groups. The smallness of 
sample size has prevented us from constructing interactive variables which combine two or more 
features of firm investment behavior. For instance, whether relatively more credit worthy firms 
equally depend upon internal liquidity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
References 
 
 
Akerlof A. George (1970), The market for ‘lemons’: Quality and the market mechanism, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, pp. 488-500. 
Ahluwalia J. Isher (1985), “Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties”, 
Oxford University Press, India.  
Athey J. Michael and Prem S. Laumas (1994), Internal Funds and Corporate Investment in India,  
Journal of Development Economics, 45, pp. 287 – 303. 
Audretsch B. David and Julie Ann Elston (2002), Does Firm Size Matter? Evidence on the 
impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, pp. 1-17. 
Athukorala Prem-chandra and Kunal Sen (2002), “Saving, Investment, and Growth in India”, 
Oxford University Press, India. 
Bilsborrow E. Richard (1977), The Determinants of Fixed Investment by Manufacturing Firms in 
a Developing Country, International Economic Review, 18 (3), pp. 697-717. 
Bond Stephen, Julie Elston, Jacques Mairesse, and B. Mulkay (1997), Financial Factors and 
Investment in Belgium, France, Germany and UK: A Comparison Using Panel Data, 
NBER Working Paper No. 5900. 
Bond Stephen, Julie Elston, Jacques Mairesse, and B. Mulkay (2003), Financial Factors and 
Investment in Belgium, France, Germany and UK: A Comparison Using Panel Data, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (1), pp. 153-165. 
Binswanger M (1999), “Stock markets, speculative bubbles and economic growth: New 
dimensions in the co-evolution of real and financial markets”, Cheltenham, UK & 
Northampton, US: Edward Elgar. 
Bhattacharyya Surajit and Surajit Sinha (2004), Accelerators and Investment Functions, The 
Indian Economic Journal, 52 (1-2), pp. 21-32. 
Clark J. Maurice (1917), Business acceleration and the law of demand: A technical factor in 
economic cycles, Journal of Political Economy, 25, pp.217–235. 
Chennery B. Hollis (1952), Overcapacity and the acceleration principle,  Econometrica, 20, pp. 
1-28. 
Chandra Prasanna (2001), “Financial Management”, Tata McGraw-Hill, New Delhi. 
Chatelain Jean-Bernard (2002), Structural Modeling of Investment and Financial Constraints: 
Where Do We Stand?, National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 28. 
Eastwood Robert and Renu Kholi (1999), Directed Credit and Investment in Small-Scale 
Industry in India: Evidence from Firm-Level Data 1965-78, The Journal of Development 
Studies, 35 (4), pp. 42-63. 
Engle R. F., D. F. Hendry, and J-F Richard (1994), “Exogeneity,” in Testing Exogeneity, 39-70, 
N. R. Ericsson and J. S. Irons (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Fazzari M. Steven and Michael J. Athey (1987), Asymmetric Information, Financing Constraints 
and Investment, Review of Economics and Statistics, 69, pp. 481-487. 
Fazzari M. Steven, R. Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C. Peterson (1988), Financing Constraints and 
Corporate Investment,  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 141-195. 
Fazzari M. Steven and Bruce C. Peterson (1993), Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New 
Evidence on Financing Constraints, RAND Journal of Economics, 24 (3), pp. 328-42. 
Greenwald Bruce, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss (1984), Informational Imperfections in 
the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations, American Economic Review, 74, 
pp.194-199. 
 28
Hausman A. J (1978), Specification Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46 (6), pp. 1251-
1271. 
Hoshi Takeo, Anil Kashyap and David Scharfstein (1991), Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and 
Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106, pp. 33-60. 
Hubbard R. Glenn (1998), Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36, pp. 193-225. 
Jorgenson W. Dale (1963), Capital Theory and Investment Behavior, American Economic 
Review, 53,  pp.  247- 259. 
Jorgenson W. Dale and James A. Stephenson (1967), Investment Behavior in U.S. 
Manufacturing, 1947-1960,  Econometrica, 35 (2), pp. 169-220. 
Jorgenson W. Dale and Calvin D. Siebert (1968), A Comparison of Alternative Theories of 
Corporate Investment Behavior, American Economic Review, LVIII (4), pp. 681-712. 
Jorgenson W. Dale (1971), Econometric Studies of Investment Behavior: A Survey, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 9 (4), pp. 1111-1147. 
Jensen M and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-60. 
Koyck M. Leendert (1954), “Distributed lags and investment analysis”, Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
Krishnamurty, K. and D.U. Sastry (1975), “Investment and Financing in the Corporate Sector in 
India”, Tata McGraw-Hill, New Delhi.   
Kadapakkam Palani-Rajan, P.C. Kumar and Leigh A. Riddick (1998), The impact of cash flows 
and firm size on investment: The international evidence, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 22, pp. 293-320. 
Kumar A. Ganesh, Kunal Sen and R. R. Vaidya (2001), Outward Orientation, Investment and 
Finance Constraints: A Study of Indian Firms, Journal of Development Studies, 37 (4), 
pp. 133-149. 
Kumar A. Ganesh, Kunal Sen and R. R. Vaidya (2002), Does the Source of Financing Matter? 
Finacial Markets, Financial Intermediaries and Investment in India, Journal of 
International Development, 14 (2), pp. 211-228. 
Modigliani Franco and Merton Miller (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, 48 (3), pp. 261-297. 
Myers C. Stuart and Nicholas Majluf (1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13, pp. 187-221. 
Stiglitz E. Joseph and Andrew Weiss (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, American Economic Review, 71 (3), pp.393-410. 
Samuel Cherian (1996), Stock Market and Investment: The Signaling Role of the Market, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1612. 
Sen Kunal and R. R. Vaidya (1997), “The Process of Financial Liberalization in India”, Oxford 
University Press, India. 
Tobin James (1969), A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 1, pp.15-29. 
Tybout James (1983), Credit Rationing and Investment Behavior in a Developing Country, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, pp. 598-607. 
White Halbert (1980), A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,   Econometrica, 48, pp. 817-838. 
 
 29
Appendix I 
 
Table 1: Nominal Net Sales 
Table 1.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
 
Total number of firms in each year: 26 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: General Engineering 
 
Year 
 
Mean 
(‘000 crores) 
Median 
(‘000 crores) 
Max. Value 
(‘000 crores) 
Min. Value 
(‘000 crores) 
SD 
 
1991-92 4748821 1968877 30846900 350540 6713289 
1992-93 5046887 2330971 30250800 306375 6988086 
1993-94 6007452 2081471 37041000 363486 8639562 
1994-95 7736224 2231701 56698300 483826 12193586 
1995-96 10013967 2645084 78657000 643280 16577861 
1996-97 12058538 3199199 97683200 638408 20624526 
1997-98 11453406 3014888 73270500 528678 17642310 
1998-99 12279511 3268427 72500400 546060 18665862 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
8668101 
 
15.16 
2592577 
 
8.15 
59618512.5 
 
15.78 
482581.63 
 
8.21 
13505635.2 
 
17.22 
Total number of firms in each year: 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Mean 
(‘000 crores) 
Median 
(‘000 crores) 
Max. Value 
(‘000 crores) 
Min. Value 
(‘000 crores) 
SD 
 
1989-90 1272212 795676.5 6538139 15951 1515964.2 
1990-91 1607567 1051100 7370604 30037 1845629 
1991-92 1955652 1269511 7448675 46249 2108512 
1992-93 2274264 1400603 7970328 100851 2289076 
1993-94 2803247 1422956 11619350 194081 3035175 
1994-95 3692769 1804282 15250479 216154 3963120 
1995-96 4681263 2184011 16387526 288584 4907674 
1996-97 5278322 2343960 17514059 314133 5442443 
1997-98 5491173 3004087 21077608 316962 5602912 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
3228497 
 
20.36 
1697354 
 
18.52 
12352974 
 
16.56 
169222.4 
 
50.93 
3412278.3 
 
18.17 
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Table 2: 1Retained Earningst−  
Table 2.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
Year Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value SD 
1990-91 50479.77 21826 246309 0 71350.93 
1991-92 75610.73 18574 619957 0 126670.7 
1992-93 93295.58 29879 406413 2628 110507.7 
1993-94 130230.6 43247.5 750633 0 175759.8 
1994-95 159090.7 56628 885808 0 220253.2 
1995-96 231534.4 108521 1300662 0 319439.8 
1996-97 164085.5 61303 853453 0 215097.6 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
129189.6 
 
25.22 
48568.36 
 
28.29 
723319.3 
 
38.73 
375.43 
 
− 
177011.4 
 
26.92 
   Total number of firms in each year: 26 
 
Table 2.2: General Engineering 
Year Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value SD 
1992-93 77702.03 16697.5 474186 0 128854.5 
1993-94 184968.75 47663 1160712 0 297135.6 
1994-95 394629.86 111033 2479651 0 659647 
1995-96 526475.9 127842.5 3628200 232 960036.3 
1996-97 627931.79 111396.5 5499400 0 1229338 
1997-98 521470.29 74696.5 3575168 0 952950.8 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
388863.1 
 
57.42 
81554.83 
 
57.55 
2802886 
 
64.26 
38.67 
 
− 
704660.3 
 
60.74 
   Total number of firms in each year: 28 
 
Table 3: -1Profitabilityt  
Table 3.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
Year Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value SD 
1990-91 0.05 0.04 0.30 -0.05 0.06 
1991-92 0.06 0.03 0.28 -0.01 0.06 
1992-93 0.07 0.04 0.30  0.01 0.07 
1993-94 0.07 0.04 0.35 -0.08 0.08 
1994-95 0.08 0.05 0.34  0.01 0.07 
1995-96 0.08 0.06 0.27 -0.003 0.06 
1996-97 0.06 0.05 0.33 -0.09 0.07 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
0.07 
 
2.86 
0.04 
 
6.04 
0.31 
 
2.49 
−0.03 
 
 
207.48 
0.07 
 
 
2.31 
   Total number of firms in each year: 26 
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Table 3.2: General Engineering 
Year Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value SD 
1992-93 0.03 0.03 0.14 –0.17 0.06 
1993-94 0.04 0.04 0.14 –0.06 0.04 
1994-95 0.09 0.06 0.83 –0.04 0.15 
1995-96 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.00015 0.03 
1996-97 0.05 0.06 0.14 –0.21 0.06 
1997-98 0.06 0.06 0.14 –0.009 0.04 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
0.06 
 
24.19 
0.05 
 
17.02 
0.26 
 
82.13 
−0.08 
 
−28855.80 
0.06 
 
35.29 
   Total number of firms in each year: 28 
 
Table 4: 1Financial Strengtht−  
Table 4.1: Electronics, Electrical Equipment and Cables 
Year Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value SD 
1990-91 0.29 0.27 0.57 0.13 0.11 
1991-92 0.29 0.26 0.52 0.05 0.13 
1992-93 0.33 0.29 0.68 0.14 0.15 
1993-94 0.38 0.37 0.71 0.08 0.17 
1994-95 0.41 0.41 0.80 0.13 0.16 
1995-96 0.41 0.46 0.65 0.14 0.15 
1996-97 0.42 0.42 0.71 0.14 0.15 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
0.36 
 
6.59 
0.35 
 
8.29 
0.66 
 
0.05 
0.12 
 
24.63 
0.15 
 
5.41 
   Total number of firms in each year: 26 
 
 
Table 4.2: General Engineering 
 
Year Mean Median Max. Value Min. Value SD 
1992-93 0.30 0.28 0.74 –0.18 0.19 
1993-94 0.34 0.34 0.73 –0.18 0.19 
1994-95 0.39 0.41 0.68 –0.20 0.17 
1995-96 0.41 0.42 0.66 0.19 0.12 
1996-97 0.43 0.40 0.73 0.15 0.12 
1997-98 0.44 0.41 0.77 0.16 0.14 
Average   
(all years) 
Avg. annual 
change (%) 
0.38 
 
7.99 
0.38 
 
8.10 
0.72 
 
1.14 
−0.01 
 
−39.04 
0.15 
 
−4.03 
  Total number of firms in each year: 28 
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Appendix II 
 
Table 1: Hausman LM Test Results 
 
                                                                                    EEEC                         GE 
                                             Variable       LM statistic              LM statistic 
 
ts  5.04 0.27 
1ts −  2.09 2.21 
j
1
N
ti −  
2.15     10.68 a 
tS∆  1.60 3.24 
1tS −∆    7.60 a 2.36 
j
1
N
tI −  
  7.58 a 0.80 
l
ts  5.30 0.09 
m
1ts −  2.91 0.06 
m
1
N
ti −  
3.16 0.15 
l
tS∆  1.69   6.89 
a 
m
1tS −∆  2.18 3.82 
m
1
N
tI −  
  9.73 a 0.03 
                                Critical value of 2χ (1 df) = 6.63 (at 1%). a: the null hypothesis is rejected at 1%. 
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Table 2: Hausman LM Test of Profitability and Financial Strength 
 
Table 2.1: Nominal Net Investment Function I 
                                                                                    EEEC                            GE 
                                              Variable                   LM statistic               LM statistic 
 
Profitability 
FINS 
10.09 a 
2.76 
0.55 
0.64 
 
                                 Critical value of 2χ (1 df) = 6.63 (at 1%). a: rejects the null hypothesis at 1%.  
 
Table 2.2: Nominal Net Investment Function II 
                                                                                        EEEC                           GE 
                                             Variable                     LM statistic              LM statistic 
 
Profitability 
FINS 
  6.66 a 
5.89 
3.94 
1.87 
 
                                 Critical value of 2χ (1 df) = 6.63 (at 1%). a: rejects the null hypothesis at 1%.  
 
Table 2.3: Real Net Investment Function I 
                                                                                         EEEC                           GE 
                                               Variable                    LM statistic               LM statistic 
 
Profitability 
FINS 
10.65 a 
2.79 
2.30 
1.04 
 
                                 Critical value of 2χ (1 df) = 6.63 (at 1%). a: rejects the null hypothesis at 1%.  
 
Table 2.4: Real Net Investment Function II 
                                                                                         EEEC                           GE 
                                               Variable                    LM statistic               LM statistic 
 
Profitability 
FINS 
  6.76 a 
5.83 
3.30 
1.61 
 
                                 Critical value of 2χ (1 df) = 6.63 (at 1%).  a: rejects the null hypothesis at 1%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
